Distributive fairness intercultural ultimatum game

Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games. A surprisingly large amount of otherregarding behavior is the common finding of experiments on bargaining, public goods, and trust. Elizabeth Hoffman et al. View 1 excerpt, references background. In a two-level ultimatum game, one player offers an amount to two other players who then, in the case of acceptance, divide this amount by playing an ultimatum game.

The first offer has to be … Expand. View 1 excerpt, references methods. Interpersonal comparisons of utility in bargaining: evidence from a transcontinental ultimatum game. We use a standard ultimatum game, but in one treatment, Indian subjects … Expand.

This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 37 papers with 75 results from ultimatum game experiments. This … Expand. View 3 excerpts, references background. Abstract On 11 May , readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector mode: each participant chooses not only how … Expand. We run an experiment in order to evaluate the relationship between power, or the search for power, and the degree of altruism.

In particular we experimentally tested whether an organization … Expand. View 2 excerpts, references background.

Culture, nationality and demographics in ultimatum games. There will be no difference between the behavior of risk-neutral and risk-seeking individuals. In one-shot games receivers cannot send signals to the individuals initiating offers. Risk attitudes should not affect the acceptance decision. Prediction 4. The risk attitudes of individuals playing one-shot games should not affect their decisions to accept an offer.

Social value orientations may be important. Pro-social individuals tend to make decisions regarding distributions of income that maximize group payoffs. Pro-self individuals who are individualists are trying to maximize their own payoffs while those who are competitive try to maximize the amount by which their payoffs exceed the payoffs of others.

Aggressors try to minimize the payoffs of others. Prediction 5. Pro-social individuals are more likely to accept offers than individuals who have pro-self social value orientations. Within the context of an ultimatum game, offers that are less than half of the maximum amount a sender can offer may be viewed as unfair. If the Offer Index is equal to the amount offered divided by the maximum potential offer, an Offer Index less than 0.

The Offer Index is an exogenous measure of fairness. An endogenous measure of fairness such as one described in Section 2 permits the realization of an outcome in which an exogenously determined fairness offer such as a or split may be rejected while an unfair offer such as a split may be accepted. As with the Offer Index, our expectation is that,. Prediction 7. The greater is the endogenous Fairness Index ratio or difference , the greater is the likelihood that an offer will be accepted.

Offer decisions are evaluated with an OLS regression of the variables identifying pro-social value orientations, risk aversion and risk seeking attitudes on the offers sent. The coefficients for the independent variables in the Offer Model are presented in column 1 of Table 1. These results provide support for Predictions 1, 2 and 3. A summary of the acceptances by amount offered and by the Fairness Index measured as the ratio is presented in Table 2. Offers that are identified as fair according to this Fairness Index are always accepted.

Generally, the lower the offer or the Fairness Index the less likely it is that the offer will be accepted. The coefficients for the independent variables in the Offer-Accep- tance Models are presented in column 2, 3 and 4 of Table 1. Prediction 4 is that risk attitudes should not be significant in the Offer-Acceptance Model. The data support Prediction 4. Pro-social value orientations are predicted to increase the likelihood of accepting an offer relative to pro-self.

Table 1. Regression coefficients for the offer and offer-acceptance models. Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, p-values for two-sided t-tests for the offer model and p-values for two-sided z-tests for the offer- acceptance models are in brackets.

Table 2. Summary of acceptances by amount offered and by fairness index ratio. The data support Predictions 6 and 7.

Three regressions were run that are not presented in Table 1. This was done to capture the result comparable to that in [1]. Both the variables for the amount received and the amount sent by the responder are statistically significant and consistent with the expected signs positive for the former and negative for the latter. Even though the pseudo-R 2 values for each of Models II and III are at least twenty percent larger than that for Model I, these results do not support Prediction 8 and cannot be used to support one fairness measure over any other based on this measure of goodness-of-fit.

This is not the case for Model I. However, conditioning the fairness measure with the amount the receiver sends affects the outcome for both Models II and III. This supports Prediction 9. It should be noted, however, that as long as we are dealing with likelihoods of rejecting offers, it is still possible that we will observe rejections of fair offers and acceptances of unfair offers even though the likelihood of the former is greater than the likelihood of the latter.

We have conducted a controlled laboratory experiment that permitted us to derive an endogenous measure of fairness to use in replace of the more conventional exogenous fairness measure embodied in the amount offered in an ultimatum game. To do this we expand the ultimatum game environment to one in which participants make decisions as both senders and receivers.

The receiving decisions are unique in the sense that participants are confronted with an actual offer and must accept or reject this offer as compared to the strategy vector mechanism. We then tested the Offer Model and Offer-Acceptance Models with the data derived from the experiment. The data supported the predictions anticipated from our Offer Model. If the amount sent by the receiver as well as the offer received can provide a basis for the fairness measure, this condition may be satisfied.

There exist examples of these anomalous results for the estimated models using the Fairness Indices but not using the exogenous fairness measure represented by the Offer Index. Therefore, an endogenous fairness index based on the actual behavior of individuals participating in ultimatum bargaining provides insight into understanding why anomalous results may be made and this does not require that we specifically ask people what they believe other people will do.

The actual behavior of people can provide sufficient information. The usual disclaimer applies. The first result is the original article by [2] that is cited around times… Thousands of ultimatum game experiments and extensions have been published in the meantime.

We do not have data on the sex of the participants in our ultimatum game sessions, but we do have their social value orientations and risk attitudes. The even numbered people are in one room and the odd numbered people are in another room. Participants 1, 3 and 5 are in one room. Participants 2, 4 and 6 are in a different room. Participant 1 sends to participant 2. Participant 2 sends to participant 3. Participant 3 sends to participant 4. Participant 4 sends to participant 5.

Participant 5 sends to participant 6. Participant 6 sends to participant 1. The sensitivity of results from this mechanism to the stakes in the game and the location of the origin of the ring are presented in [18].

The results of the ring game are used to understand fairness in bargaining games, investment in research and development, voluntary contributions toward public good provision and trust and trustworthiness [5] [6] [19] - [21].

If the Offer Index exceeds 0. EconStor Survey - We need your Feedback! Distributive fairness in an intercultural ultimatum game. Jena Economic Research Papers No. Does geographic or perceived social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining?